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‘In aliquibus locis est consuetudo’: French Lawyers
and the Lombard Customs of Fiefs in the
Mid-Thirteenth Century
 
The long-standing problem of the authority of custom has concerned
generations of legal historians, and its development in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries has occupied a privileged seat in this debate.1 This
period was indeed a highly constructive one, being at the intersection of a
series of processes which would lead to a wealthier, more populated and
better-organised society and thus lay the foundations of modern Europe.
The emergence of the ius commune and its relations with local legal
traditions consequently lie at the core of various paradigms concerning
the history of Continental law and European legal systems. Studies on the
legal and institutional processes of this period have shed much light upon
the revival of Roman law, the new ways of conceiving of law and the legal
profession, as well as the progressive bureaucratisation of power relation-
ships and an ever more widespread commitment of law to writing.2 In
this essay, I consider one of the most powerful among the narratives that
have informed historical interpretations of this age of change. It became
1 V. Scialoja, ‘Sulla const. 3 Cod. Quae sit longa consuetudo e la sua conciliazione col fr. 32,
§ 1, Dig. De legibus: difesa di un’antica opinione’, Archivio giuridico, 24 (1880), 420–30; E.
Cortese, La norma giuridica. Spunti teorici nel diritto comune classico, 2 vols. (Milan, repr.
1995), vol. II, 101–67; A. Gouron, ‘Coutume contre Loi chez les premiers glossateurs’, in
A. Gouron and A. Rigaudiére (eds.), Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et génese de l’Etat
(Montpellier, 1988), 117–30; E. Conte, ‘Roman Law vs Custom in a Changing Society:
Italy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’, in P. Andersen and M. Münster-Swendsen
(eds.), Custom: The Development and Use of a Legal Concept in the Middle Ages
(Copenhagen, 2009), 33–50.
2 H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(Cambridge, 1983), 120–64; M. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000–1800
(Washington, DC, 1995); S. Reynolds, ‘The Emergence of Professional Law in the Long
Twelfth Century’, Law and History Review, 21(2) (2003), 347–66.
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widespread in modern scholarship thanks to the influence of the
nineteenth-century German constitutionalists, who envisaged this period
as a transition from an age dominated by customary law to an age
governed by the new law of the ‘learned’.3 Following old anti-Romanist
sentiments – the first examples date to sixteenth-century France – this
view found one of its most prominent supporters in Fritz Kern. In an
influential article on law and constitution in the Middle Ages (1919),
then translated into English in his book Kingship and Law (1939), the
German scholar deemed custom to be the only true law of medieval
people.4 Resting on habit (Sitte) and popular belief (Volksglaube),
custom was ‘warm-blooded, vague, confused, and impractical, technic-
ally clumsy, but creative, sublime, and suited to human needs’. At the
opposite end, Roman law was considered a cold artificial construct,
alien to medieval societies, made up of ‘unintelligible laws [that] seem
to be made arbitrarily by men, or even to be taken over from the
heathen Romans, and resurrected at Bologna in lecture-rooms and folio
volumes’.5
The opposition of ‘cold new law’ against ‘warm old custom’ seems to
owe much to the ‘Italophobia’ developed by early modern French intel-
lectuals, but this was then reformed into a Romanticised idea of the
adherence of custom to the spirit of the nation.6 It would be redundant
to repeat here the various criticisms brought against this ideological
stance.7 It is worth noting, however, that the powerful narrative of a
clear-cut shift from custom-based societies towards systems based on
positive, codified law has been very resilient, carving its way into current
historical interpretations of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century transi-
tion. It is sufficient merely to glimpse the sheer abundance of legal
anthropological studies for the pre-transition era and the predominance
3 Conte, ‘Roman Law’; E. Conte, ‘Consuetudine, Coutume, Gewohnheit and Ius Commune:
An Introduction’, Rechtsgeschichte, 24 (2016), 234–43; L. Gilissen, La coutume (Turnhout,
1982), 24–32.
4 F. Kern, ‘Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter’, Historische Zeitschrift, 120 (1919), 1–79,
translated into English as F. Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages: A Classic Study of
Early Constitutional Law, trans. S. B. Chrimes (Oxford, 1939).
5 Kern, Kingship, 179–80.
6 D. R. Kelley, ‘De Origine Feudorum: The Beginnings of an Historical Problem’, Speculum,
39(2) (1964), 207–28, at 207–8.
7 Andersen and Münster-Swendsen (eds.), Custom; M. Ryan, ‘Feudal Obligations and
Rights of Resistance’, in N. Fryde, P. Monnet, and O. G. Oexle (eds.), Die Gegenwart des
Feudalismus (Göttingen, 2002), 51–78.
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of rigorously legal studies for the post-transition period in order to
understand how historians still tend to assume the model implicitly.8
From the ‘Feudal Law’ of the Medieval State to the Rediscovery
of the Libri feudorum
The study of feudal law emerging in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
represents a privileged vantage point to reappraise this transition since it
lies at the core of old and recent debates on the relationship between law
and custom. Our point of departure will be the paradigm of feudalism
developed by François-Louis Ganshof, one of the most resilient legal
interpretations of feudal relationships. In his most famous book,
Qu’est-ce-que la féodalité? (1944), Ganshof relied on the foundational
idea that feudal law was the law of the medieval state par excellence. An
earlier formulation of this idea was proposed by the German historian
Heinrich Mitteis, who, in his book Lehnsrecht und Staatsgewalt
(Feudal Law and State Power, 1933), framed within a coherent consti-
tutional theory the shared conviction that feudalism had first emerged
in the Merovingian and Carolingian eras. In Mitteis’s and Ganshof’s
view, feudal law was a very apt example of law emerging from raw
practice, in a way that in many aspects matched the constitutionalist
idea of custom. Feudal law, indeed, was thought to stem naturally
from the power relationships that kept the nobility together in the
heartland of the Carolingian empire. Here, feudal relationships were
nothing more than private agreements between lords and their fol-
lowers. The Carolingians, however, created a constitutional precedent
by using them as vital tools for the creation of imperial authority. The
progressive formalisation of the rules governing the exchange of fiefs
and protection in return for fidelity and military aid, sealed through
precise rituals, would develop only later, from the tenth to the thir-
teenth centuries, the age of classic feudalism. Concerned as they were
with suggesting a coherent model potentially applicable to all of
medieval Europe, Mitteis first and Ganshof afterwards proposed that
8 W. Davies and P. Fouracre (eds.), The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe
(Cambridge, 1992); C. Wickham, Courts and Conflict in Twelfth-Century Tuscany (New
York, 2003); F. Cheyette, ‘Suum cuique tribuere’, French Historical Studies, 6(3) (1976),
287–99. Criticisms of this methodological divide come from: S. Teuscher, Lords’ Rights
and Peasant Stories: Writing and the Formation of Tradition in the Later Middle Ages
(Philadelphia, PA, 2012); B. Lemesle, Conflits et justice au Moyen Âge. Normes, loi et
résolution des conflits en Anjou au XIe et XIIe siècles (Paris, 2008).
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the feudal law developing from the Carolingian era was the only
possible means by which any medieval form of territorial power could
guarantee constitutional order and become a state.9
The main criticisms brought against this model concern the conviction
that feudal law was a spontaneous phenomenon inherent to medieval
values – i.e. that it was the law of a profoundly feudal society.10 The main
fault of Mitteis and Ganshof was to have neglected in their shaping of the
feudal categories the role of a book, the Libri feudorum, that had been
compiled in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Italy.11 To be sure, the
book had been studied almost uninterruptedly for centuries, but most
modern scholars had (to some extent rightly) deemed it to be nothing
more than the local custom of northern Italy, and hence evidence for
the Lombard fief alone.12 Nonetheless, the extraordinary afterlife of
the Libri deserved a more thorough analysis. In its first version, the
book was a compound of early twelfth-century source material on
fiefs, written and collected by Lombard practitioners to help other
Lombard practitioners. Seven short tracts were first put together about
1150, but other texts were continuously added for about a century.13
By 1207, an incomplete apparatus of glossae was compiled, and, by
about 1250, Accursius, the most famous law professor in Bologna,
concluded this work. The completion of the apparatus allowed the
inclusion, apparently by Accursius himself, of the Libri in the new
editions of the Corpus iuris civilis produced in Bologna. The Libri thus
became the tenth book of the Authenticum – the collection of
9 H. Mitteis, Lehnsrecht und Staatsgewalt. Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen
Verfassungsgeschichte (Weimar, 1933); F.-L. Ganshof, Qu’est-ce-que la féodalité?
(Brussels, 1944).
10 See the outline in D. Heirbaut, ‘Feudal Law’, in H. Pihlajamäki, M. D. Dubber and M.
Godfrey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Legal History (Oxford, 2018), 528–48.
11 LF 1 and LF 2 refer respectively to book 1 and book 2 of the Libri feudorum, edited in K.
Lehmann, Das Langobardische Lehnrecht (Handschriften, Textentwicklung, ältester Text
u. Vulgattext): Nebst den Capitula Extraordinaria (Göttingen, 1896). All translations of
this text are mine.
12 The title of the 1896 edition, ‘The Feudal Law of the Lombards’ reveals this conviction:
Lehmann, Das Langobardische Lehnrecht. The same idea is expounded by the influential
Italian author P. Brancoli Busdraghi, La formazione storica del feudo Lombardo come
diritto reale (Spoleto, 1999).
13 P. Weimar, ‘Die Handschriften des Liber Feudorum und seiner Glossen’, Rivista
Internazionale di Diritto Comune, 1 (1990), 31–98.
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Justinian’s Novels until then subdivided into nine books.14 This inser-
tion, of course, would grant to the book an exceptional and enduring
success. The Libri became the reference book to drive doctrinal debate
on fiefs in a way that makes it very difficult to doubt its long-term
influence in shaping late medieval and modern notions of feudal law
and feudalism. This may also make it ‘incomprehensible’, as Dirk
Heirbaut suggests, that views such as Mitteis’s and Ganshof’s could
survive well into the 1990s.15
Susan Reynolds, the most radical opponent of the Ganshofian model,
holds that the Libri feudorum was probably principally responsible for
the construction of a ‘feudal vocabulary’ through four centuries of schol-
arly debate on feudal law and feudalism.16 Her views have gained con-
siderable authority among medievalists, but have been criticised by
historians of medieval law mainly on the grounds that, at least from
the twelfth century onwards, more or less formalised norms regulating
feudal practices and institutions existed independently of any scholarly
interpretation of the Libri.17 I argue that holding that the new law – or
the new fief – was entirely a product of the professionalisation of law or,
more precisely, of the combined action of rulers and their bureaucrats
may be seen as bearing the same original sin as the old German consti-
tutional theory of custom vis-à-vis law. It rests on the assumption of a
gap between custom accessible by any common man and the merely
artificial new law. The relevant question here goes beyond whether the
Libri feudorum related to the socio-political developments of twelfth-
century Lombardy – and thus whether the book contained customary law
or not. The principal problem, which I am going to tackle, is understand-
ing how some of the ‘learned’ agents of this process, the alleged makers of
the artifice, conceived of the practices and customs of fiefs they described
in their treatises, and arguably taught to their students, in relation to the
14 A. Rota, ‘L’apparato di Pillio alle Consuetudines feudorum e il ms. 1004 dell’Archivio di
Stato di Roma’, Studi e memorie per la storia dell’Università di Bologna, 14 (1938),
61–103; Weimar, ‘Handschriften’.
15 Heirbaut, ‘Feudal Law’; K. Pennington, ‘Feudal Oath of Fidelity and Homage’, in K.
Pennington and M. Harris Eichbauer (eds.), Law as Profession and Practice in Medieval
Europe: Essays in Honor of James A. Brundage (Farnham, 2011), 93–115; M. Ryan, ‘Ius
commune feudorum in the Thirteenth Century’, in A. Romano (ed.), “. . . colendo
iustitiam et iura condendo . . .” Federico II legislatore del Regno di Sicilia nell’Europa del
Duecento (Rome, 1997), 51–65.
16 S. Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford, 1994), 1–74.
17 Pennington, ‘Feudal Oath’; Heirbaut, ‘Feudal Law’.
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Libri feudorum. Tackling this issue compels us to consider, on the one
hand, the possible normative value of the Libri and, on the other, the
mechanisms of its absorption in the system of Civil law, that is, the extent
to which the making of the ius commune feudorum related to issues
emerging from practice. In what follows I try to answer these questions
by briefly considering the impact of the Libri in the thirteenth century
and its relations with the customary reality of Italy according to two early
authors on feudal law: Obertus de Orto and Iacobus de Ardizone. I move
then to a broader analysis of the first treatises on fiefs produced by
lawyers from beyond the Alps, to reassess the authoritative and norma-
tive value of the Libri outside Italy.
The Influence and Impact of the Libri feudorum
The life and afterlife of the Libri support the thesis of a broad diffusion of
the text from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. Towards the end of
the twelfth century, the source material collected in Lombardy became
the object of scientific analysis by the Civilians, Pillius de Medicina being
most likely the first one to use it as a teaching book, in Modena from
1182. This can be inferred from the fact that he produced an apparatus of
glossae to the Libri and a Summa feudorum, which is unfortunately lost
and is known only thanks to a substantial reworking, most likely carried
out by Accursius.18 Thus, the Libri is the first and maybe the only
example of a medieval custumal to be accepted as an authoritative
source – a teaching book, and hence a citable text – in open contraven-
tion of the demand by the Bolognese scholars to cite only the Corpus iuris
civilis. However, it was only decades later that experts in law continued
the tradition initiated by Pillius. The mysterious Symon Vicentinus
(d. before 1263) left some glossae, and he is also known for a Liber
domini Symonis, likely to be a lost recompilation of the Libri feudorum.
He may have used it as a textbook when he taught in Padua, perhaps in
1222–8, but this hypothesis is purely speculative.19 Iacobus de Ardizone
18 E. Cortese, ‘Pillio da Medicina’, in I. Birocchi, E. Cortese, A. Mattone, and M. N. Miletti
(eds.), Dizionario biografico dei giuristi italiani (XII–XX secolo), 2 vols. (Bologna, 2013)
(henceforth, DBGI), vol. II, 1587–90; E. Conte, ‘Modena 1182: The Origins of a New
Paradigm of Ownership. The Interface Between Historical Contingency and the Scholarly
Invention of Legal Categories’, GLOSSAE. European Journal of Legal History, 15 (2018),
4–18.
19 E. J. H. Schrage, ‘Symon Vicentinus, un docteur très excellent du XIIIe’siècle’, Tijdschrift
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 55 (1987), 297–320.
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and Odofredus produced glossae and recompilations of the Libri and also
two famous Summae feudorum based on the book, probably both written
in the 1230s. About 1250, or slightly earlier, the Margarita feudorum by
Dullius Gambarini, active in Naples, would attest to the need to normal-
ise the practical application of the book.20 On the canonistic side, glossae
and commentaries on fiefs flourished after the title De feudis (X. 3.20)
was inserted in the Compilatio tertia (1210), but canonists relied almost
exclusively on Gratian’s Decretum, collections of decretals, and imperial
decrees. Only with the Summa decretalium by Hostiensis, concluded
about 1253, did the Libri appear as an established source in the Canon
law literature, even though the commentary on X. 3.20 contained in this
treatise was mostly an adaptation of Accursius’s reworking of Pillius’s
short treatise.21 In sum, the so-called ius commune feudorum did not
emerge until the second half of the thirteenth century. This success was
due principally to the fact that the Justinianic sources did not contain any
reference to ‘fiefs’ and ‘vassals’ and the glossators felt at some point
compelled to find an authoritative source relating to these matters. This
limitation of the Corpus iuris civilis was a prevalent complaint among the
authors on feudal law, and it also served as a justification for the utilisa-
tion of the Libri.22
Nonetheless, there are at least three good reasons to believe that such
general acceptance of the Libri was neither easy nor immediate. In the
first place, the book was not part of the ordinary curricula of the law
schools but was taught only in extraordinary lectures; consequently, its
teaching was not as widespread as one might think.23 In the second place,
direct citations of the Libri in charters and court proceedings were quite
rare, and such evidence emerges only in the late thirteenth century.24
Finally, until then, the ranks of commentators on the Libri – no more
20 A. Stella, ‘The Liber Ardizonis: Reshaping the Libri feudorum in the Thirteenth Century’,
Studi Medievali, 58 (2017), 175–227; M. Montorzi, Processi istituzionali: episodi di
formalizzazione giuridica ed evenienze d’aggregazione istituzionale attorno ed oltre il
feudo: saggi e documenti (Padua, 2005), 135–259.
21 K. Pennington, ‘Enrico da Susa, cardinale Ostiense’, in DBGI, vol. I, 795–8; M. Ryan, ‘The
Libri feudorum and the Roman Law’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge
(1994), 134–220.
22 Ryan, ‘Ius commune feudorum’.
23 M. Huneke, Iurisprudentia romano-saxonica. Die Glosse zum Sachsenspiegel Lehnrecht
und die Anfänge deutscher Rechtswissenschaft (Harassowitz, 2014), 298–9.
24 See the consilia by Dino del Mugello: Ryan, ‘Ius commune feudorum’, 56–65; A. Stella,
‘Bringing the Feudal Law Back Home: Social Practice and the Law of Fiefs in Italy and
Provence (1100–1250)’, Journal of Medieval History, 46 (2020), 396–418.
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than fifteen authors – were tiny if compared with the vast legions of
commentators on the Corpus iuris civilis.25 Therefore, there is enough
evidence to argue that although most Italian lawyers accepted the Libri as
both an authoritative source to drive scholarly debate on fiefs and a
normative text, most non-Italian lawyers struggled to accept its authority
and normativity.
This criticism, indeed, would lie at the core of the sixteenth-century
Gallican polemics following the controversy concerning the origins of
fiefs, in which Charles Dumoulin played the leading role. The debate was
sparked by the fifteenth-century philologists, engendering a series of
different interpretations of the historical roots of the fief. It was
Dumoulin who put an end to it by imposing the idea that the origins
of the fief had been in early medieval Gaul. This was an attempt to
undermine any interpretation of the Libri feudorum as a text possessing
binding force or even scientific value for French lawyers. Indeed,
Dumoulin was a strenuous advocate of the absolute power of the
French Crown, and most of his intellectual efforts aimed at stressing
the independence of French law from any foreign influence. He refused
to accept the binding force of the Corpus iuris civilis, although he could
not afford to reject its value in terms of legal science.26 The Libri, on the
other hand, became a much easier target for such a polemical impetus.
The book, he thought, should not be considered part of the Corpus as it
was the mere creation of private persons, who had no authority to
establish any universal custom or law. It was nothing more than the local
custom of Lombardy.27
The long-standing success of Dumoulin’s theories, along with his
depiction of them as a break with the whole medieval tradition of the
Glossators and Commentators, has obscured the fact that their germs
were already growing in the Middle Ages. For instance, in the mid-
fourteenth century, the Auvergnat lawyer Pierre Jame d’Aurillac, then
25 G. Giordanengo, ‘La littérature juridique féodale’, in J.-F. Nieus (ed.), Le vassal, le fief et
l’écrit (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2007), 11–34, at 11–12.
26 D. R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the
French Renaissance (New York and London, 1970), 151–82.
27 C. Dumoulin, Opera Omnia (Paris, 1612), cols. 12–13; Kelley, ‘De Origine’. The terms of
this debate were very far from the concerns of the thirteenth-century jurists. Dumoulin
and the French legal antiquarians were rejecting the authenticity of the Libri, as well as its
authority and validity, in order to claim the authority, in the kingdom of France, of
French customary law.
  
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108955195.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. CSB DI GIURISPRUDENZA P.E. BENSA, on 21 May 2021 at 10:32:17, subject to the
teaching at Montpellier, accepted the text as a citable source but firmly
opposed its binding force. He asserted that
the written customs of the book of fiefs, from top to bottom, ought not to
be held at all as far as it concerns us in the entire kingdom of France. They
do not bind us in any way and deservedly so, because they have no
authority over us and because they are local. Indeed, if a controversy
arises over a fief and there is a custom on that matter that is legally
prescribed where the controversy takes place, that [custom] ought to be
observed.28
Several decades before him, the great Orleanais master Jacques de
Revigny (d. 1296) had already taken a very similar stance: even if he
considered feudal law to be written law, he scarcely mentioned it, even in
his quaestiones on fiefs, and, in his Lectura authentici, he did not consider
it as the tenth book of the collection, in contradiction to the Bolognese
school.29 As we will see, similar disagreements emerged at the very outset
of the Civilians’ discussion on fiefs.
Lombard Custom Recontextualised
One of the most common objections to the authority of the Libri was its
localised nature. Grants of fiefs in exchange for allegiance, political
support or service emerged in several regions of Europe, but regional
variations could be substantial, so that a fixed set of rules could hardly be
applicable universally.30 The Libri, of course, reflected the substantive
and procedural rules of twelfth-century Lombardy and not the customary
law developing in other regions or times. One of its authors, Obertus de
Orto, declared that the ‘custom of the realm’, i.e. the kingdom of Italy,
varied according to the ‘diverse practices (mores) of different courts and
regions’. For this reason, he could describe nothing more than the ‘usage
(usus) of fiefs that is held in our lands’, i.e. the Milanese territory, wherein
he was one of the highest political and judicial authorities.31
It took the encounter of the Civilians with the Libri to change the
nature of the book radically. By the early thirteenth century, many of the
customary norms it contained were obsolete even in Milan, where only
28 My translation from Petrus Jacobi de Aureliaco, Aurea practica libellorum (Cologne,
1575), fo. 273b.
29 L. Waelkens, La théorie de la coutume chez Jacques de Révigny (Leiden, 1984), 176–8.
30 Heirbaut, ‘Feudal Law’.
31 LF 2.1. On Obertus: L. Loschiavo, ‘Oberto dall’Orto’, in DBGI, vol. II, 1448–9.
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some sections of the book would be inserted in the 1216 ‘book of the
customs of Milan’ after thorough selection and updates.32 As a source for
the study – or the creation – of feudal law it served an entirely different
purpose, that is, to offer a shared, no matter how inconsistent, set of
notions and problems which the Glossators could use to control doctrinal
debate about issues that continued to emerge from practice.33 This is
evident in Ardizone, who in his Summa feudorum quite plainly followed
Obertus in acknowledging the highest authority of custom. Obertus,
overturning the meaning of a famous rescript by Constantine on the
supremacy of law over custom (C. 8.52[53].2) had suggested that ‘in the
judgment concerning fiefs, it is common to say what is contrary to our
laws: the authority of the Roman laws is not negligible, but they do not
extend their force so far as to override usage and practice (LF 2.1)’. This
provocative statement worked as a justificatory opening for Obertus’s
treatment of the Milanese custom of fiefs by contrast with a broader
custom of the realm, which remains in the background of Obertus’s
tracts without ever being revealed in full. Eighty-odd years later, in the
first chapters of his Summa, Ardizone developed this argument by
suggesting that unwritten custom was of the highest authority, regardless
of its crystallisation in a legal text. In what appears to be a vigorous
defence of the helpfulness of the Libri, he went on to say that ‘it was
necessary and useful to write about the controversies [over fiefs], not
because they would not be valid otherwise, since they would obtain the
force of the laws even if they remained in [unwritten] custom. . . . On the
contrary, they are written down to be better committed to memory.’34
Ardizone’s treatise is an excellent example of cross-fertilisation among
the various bodies of law. Sources of Roman law, Canon law, Lombard
law, and even the Statute Book of Verona are used all together to analyse
what the author considered the custom of fiefs only partly reflected in the
Libri.35 In order to expand his arguments, especially when the Libri or
other sources were silent on a matter or perceived of as insufficiently
detailed, he did not hesitate to bring in the local custom of Verona, his
hometown, where he worked as a judge and public officer and, most
32 Liber consuetudinum Mediolani anni 1216. Nuova edizione interamente rifatta, ed. E.
Besta (Milan, 1949), 119–32; H. Keller, ‘Die Kodifizierung des mailänder
Gewohnheitsrechts von 1216 in ihrem gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Kontext’, in
Milano e il suo territorio in età comunale (Spoleto, 1999), 145–72.
33 Ryan, ‘Ius commune feudorum’, 51–56.
34 My translation from Iacobus de Ardizone, Summa Feudorum (Asti, 1518), fo. 3r.
35 Stella, ‘Bringing the Feudal Law’.
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likely, taught law.36 This attitude reflects the bestowal of the highest
authority upon unwritten custom on the matter of fiefs: the Libri feu-
dorum, in this sense, is a contingent reflection – one of the many possible
ones – of a broader, changing body of unwritten law which needed
constant update and expansion.
Feudal Law as Case Law? Jean Blanc and the Provençal Practice
Like with Russian dolls, Obertus’s statement on the authority of custom
is embedded in Ardizone’s, and both are reported almost literally – one
might even suggest copied – in the Epitome feudorum by Iohannes
Blancus (Jean Blanc) from Marseille. Blanc was a Provençal law expert
who, in the 1230s, like many of his colleagues, studied in Italy, more
precisely at the studium of Modena, where Pillius’s teachings were still
very influential. There he learned Roman law and familiarised himself
with the Libri; in about 1250, perhaps slightly later, he was the first to
write a treatise on the book outside of Italy. Because of its apparently
unambiguous acceptance of the authority of the Libri and its heavy
reliance on Ardizone’s Summa feudorum, the Epitome has been said to
appear like an Italian treatise in all respects.37 In this work, Blanc tended
to pass over in silence the fact that he was taking more than inspiration
from his sources, which in some cases he copied word for word.
Nonetheless, his copying entailed selection. Alterations and addition of
material reveal that his agreement was only partial. It was not just
passive transcription but an active process of appropriation and
recontextualisation. When he discussed the authority of custom and
the Libri feudorum, he reported, without citing the source, Ardizone’s
treatment of the opening of Obertus’s tract. In this case, the argument is
nearly identical: feudal customs were written down because some
disputes over fiefs were solved by Roman law, others by Lombard
law, the custom of the realm, or unwritten feudal custom.38 It is custom
36 G. M. Varanini and A. Stella, ‘Scenari Veronesi per la Summa feudorum di Iacopo di
Ardizzone da Broilo’, in P. Maffei and G. M. Varanini (eds.), Honos alit artes. Studi per il
settantesimo compleanno di Mario Ascheri. La formazione del diritto comune (Florence,
2014), 266–80.
37 G. Giordanengo, ‘Blanc, Jean’, in J.-L. Halpérin, J. Krynen, and P. Arabeyre (eds.),
Dictionnaire historique des juristes français, XIIe–XXe siècle (Paris, 2015) (henceforth,
DHJF), 114; G. Giordanengo, ‘Jean Blanc, feudiste de Marseille XIIIe siècle’, Annales de la
Faculté de droit de l’Université de Bordeaux, 2 (1978), 71–93.
38 J. Blanc, Epitome feudorum (Cologne, 1565), fos. 17–18.
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that approves these unwritten rules and procedures, which do not need
to be crystallised into a text to gain authority. The only practical reason
for their commitment to writing is their usefulness for lawyers who need
to judge similar disputes; in other words, precedents possess, to some
extent, legal authority in feudal matters regardless of their oral or
written nature.
This attitude towards practice is well reflected in Blanc’s Epitome,
which, to my knowledge, is the feudal law treatise that mentions the
highest number of real cases, the second one being, not surprisingly,
Ardizone’s Summa. In the text, Blanc’s modus operandi appears in full
clarity: in several quaestiones, he begins by displaying an argument
derived from one of the Libri, Ardizone’s treatise or one of his teachers,
but often conceals his source. He then develops it by abstracting a
principle and sometimes considering its application to real cases that
he witnessed or judged, from which he eventually reaches an original
conclusion. These cases are not just informative examples but are used, to
some extent, to shape new arguments. Blanc reports disputes involving
the Templars, the Cistercians, Provençal bishops, barons, and noblemen,
which attest to his fieldwork in Provence in a period spanning from
1237 to the 1250s.39 For instance, the most famous one, the bishop of Apt
v. Bertrand de Simiane (1247), is used to develop the old question
‘whether jurisdiction adheres with castles’. Following a quaestio by
Pillius, Blanc proved that the enfeoffment of the donjon of a castle
entailed the concession of the rest of the fortification and, by extension,
the jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the surrounding territory.40
Another case, opposing the Templars against the canons of Pignans,
served to develop this argument further, by upholding the thesis that
even after the destruction of a castle the jurisdiction over its former
district would remain united.41
One of the most insightful examples, however, is the quaestio concern-
ing whether ecclesiastics can hold fiefs. Blanc began his building of the
argument from a passage of Ardizone’s Summa, which he reported
almost verbatim before expanding it in light of a novel case. The
Veronese lawyer held that any churchperson could receive fiefs in a
personal capacity since LF 2.40.3 implied that royal fiefs granted to a
church ought to revert temporarily to the king should its rector – i.e. the
39 Giordanengo, ‘Jean Blanc’, 72–79.
40 Stella, ‘Bringing’.
41 Blanc, Epitome, fos. 542–50.
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bishop or the abbot – commit a wrong. According to Ardizone, the fact
that other sources pointed in another direction – i.e. a fief-holder who
becomes a cleric ought to lose the fief – would not constitute an impedi-
ment, and so he resolved the matter without further analysis.42 Blanc, for
his part, had several reservations. He copied Ardizone’s short treatment –
again, with no mention of the source – and added that ecclesiastics could
theoretically receive a fief as long as the grantor was aware of their
clerical status.43 However, he saw ‘no reason why a cleric should receive
a fief from a layperson’ because in that case he would be subject to the
secular jurisdiction of the grantor and not the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of
his primate, as established by four decretals (X. 2.2.12, 5.39.45, 3.50.3,
3.50.6).44 The principal point of friction concerned the prohibition on
Cistercians holding any secular power, which was expressed in the rule of
the order and later confirmed by Alexander III in the decretal Recolentes
(X. 3.35.3).45 Blanc decided to mention here a case he saw in Provence, of
which there is, unfortunately, no other extant evidence.46 He remains silent
onmany details, but lets us know that, at some point, one party had exhibited
a letter by which Innocent III confirmed to the Cistercians of Thoronet the
enfeoffment of a castle by the count of Provence. Blanc’s doubts concerned
the validity of this confirmation. He suggested that this open breach of the
Cistercian rule might still be considered lawful as long as it was demonstrated
that it benefited the monks without damaging anyone else (C. 1.19.7, Decr.
C. 25 q. 2 c. 15). Nonetheless, for this to happen the confirmation should
have made clear that it was meant to break a law, i.e. the decretal Recolentes.
Since it did not mention the decretal, and since not even the pope could
relieve monks from their own rule (X. 3.35.6), he continued:
it seems to me that this confirmation damages rather than benefits the
plaintiffs, for it goes against the rule of their Order and may cause
the waiver or forfeiture of the privileges of the Cistercian Order. If the
42 Ardizone, Summa, fo. 8ra.
43 The habit of concealing sources in legal writings was not uncommon among the
Glossators, but the matter, to my knowledge, has not been treated in full. I consider
some examples in Stella, ‘Bringing’. See also E. Conte, ‘Framing the Feudal Bond:
A Chapter in the History of the Ius Commune in Medieval Europe’, Tijdschrift voor
Rechtsgeschiedenis, 80 (2012), 481–95, at 490–1.
44 Blanc, Epitome, fo. 98.
45 The decretal implied that some Cistercian monks had forgotten the pristine nature and
rule of their institution in coming to possess towns, mills, and churches, to receive oaths
of fidelity and homage, and to hold judicial and fiscal authority.
46 Blanc, Epitome, fos. 100–3.
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Cistercians accepted such things, which are against the statutes of their
Order, they would be judged by the law that is common to everyone and
not by the [special law] of the Cistercians, as said in the decretal Recolentes.47
On this basis, Blanc ends up declaring this confirmation not only void
and useless but most likely false, since it was not credible that the papal
curia would overlook such a significant matter.
These instances show very clearly how Blanc did not use actual cases to
highlight how existing custom or law ought to be applied in court
practice. Rather, he saw in them the generative force of practice. Blanc
took novel cases as precedents that could serve to expand the horizons of
feudal law, encouraging the creation of new principles. Of course, Blanc
was using the interpretative tools provided by the rising ius commune,
which entailed a high degree of abstraction and often induced him to
conceal his sources or pass over in silence essential details of the cases he
took as precedents. But he intended to move seamlessly in the wake of
Obertus and Ardizone. The example of Blanc ultimately suggests that the
mechanisms of the ‘Romanisation’ of the fief entailed a process of
abstraction that obscures the connections of the ‘new’ law with practice
more to us than to thirteenth-century lawyers.
Jean de Blanot and the Authority of Local Custom
Blanc had considered the Libri not only as an authoritative source for
doctrinal uses but also as a text reflecting custom that needed constant
expansion and updates in light of novel cases. Jean de Blanot took a very
different stance. Blanot was born in Mâcon (Burgundy) before 1230 to a
tax collector of Cluny Abbey. He completed his studies in utroque iure at
Bologna, attending the lectures of Odofredus, and he taught in the same
university in the 1250s. Later back in Burgundy, he served Duke Hugh IV
(d. 1272) and, in exchange for his service, received the castellany of
Uxelles as a fief in 1263.48 Blanot published his most famous treatise, a
commentary upon the title De actionibus of Justinian’s Institutes, at the
time of his Bolognese teaching. There is no reason to doubt that he
wrote it in Italy, but it is nevertheless clear that he had the Burgundian
context in mind and, most likely, a Burgundian audience. Emanuele
47 Ibid., fo. 103.
48 P. Arabeyre, ‘Blanot, Jean de’, in DHJF, 115–17. Although he was bailiff of Charles
d’Anjou in 1275–7, his career developed almost exclusively in Burgundy, at the service
of Hugh IV and, after him, his son Robert II.
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Conte has noted how the aim of this treatise was ‘to cast the social and
customary reality of his age in the abstract categories offered by Roman
law’ and ‘to teach practitioners in his homeland how to fit the real
relationships prevailing in that region of Europe to the procedural
patterns described by Roman institutions’.49
A point of particular interest is that Blanot decided to discuss homage
and the nature of the feudal bond within a broader treatment of the actio
praeiudicialis in rem. In Roman law this actio allowed owners to retrieve
the service of their freed slaves (liberti). Blanot implied that the act of
homage creating the feudal bond was somehow analogous to the act of
manumission of a slave – i.e. it generated similar duties connected to the
personal status created by the act.50 To be sure, these notions were not
entirely new. The analogy between vassals and liberti had already been
suggested by Iohannes Bassianus (d. 1197) and Ardizone.51 By 1233,
Roffredus Beneventanus had discussed the opportunity for lords to use
the actio praeiudicialis in the same terms as Blanot did.52 However, the
chapters on homage, overlordship, and lèse-majesté that the Burgundian
lawyer decided to insert in his treatise on legal actions would enjoy an
independent and very successful afterlife, being a valuable source for
Guillaume Durand’s famous Speculum iudiciale and Pere Albert’s
Customs of Catalonia Between Lords and Vassals.53
The point to stress here is that when relying on examples relating to
his homeland, Blanot chose to resort to famous historical events, unlike
Blanc in his Epitome, which rested on specific court cases attended by the
author. Blanot’s treatment of lèse-majesté was inspired by the war the
French Crown waged against the count of Toulouse (1209–29) and rested
on a quaestio – whether the man of my man is my man – already
developed by his master Odofredus in similar terms.54 Other arguments
on overlordship are built on the examples of the 1203 war between
49 Conte, ‘Framing’, 486.
50 Ibid., 487.
51 Ardizone, Summa, fo. 9ra: ‘Habita similitudine de liberto cui possunt imponi operae tam
certae quam incertae . . . Nam dominus Io‹hannes Baxianus› ait quod ea quae in legibus
leguntur de libertis etiam a vasallis ex regni consuetudine sunt servanda, et hoc in summa
Quibus modis quis possit ab ecclesia repellere in nomine Domini Iesu Christi’.
52 Roffredus Beneventanus, Tractatus iudiciarii ordinis (Cologne 1591), fos. 166ra–170rb.
53 Conte, ‘Framing’, 490–1.
54 J. Acher, ‘Notes sur le droit savant au moyen age’, Revue historique de droit français et
étranger, 30 (1906), 138–78, at 160–1 (Ch. XIII); Odofredus Denari, Summa feudorum
(Alcalá de Henares, 1584), fo. 112r.
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Burgundy and Lorraine (ch. XIV) and the paradoxical situation in which
the king of France found himself when he inherited the county of Mâcon
in 1239, being at once overlord and vassal of the bishop of Mâcon
(ch. XV).55 Blanot’s reliance on historical situations and informative
examples has been deemed to be an obstacle to our understanding of
how practice or local custom shaped his theoretical building.56 However,
I believe that a closer look into the text proves the contrary.
One must first note that the history of Blanot’s chapters on homage is
quite problematic. One fourteenth-century code, in MS Parma, Biblioteca
Palatina 1227, transmits them as an independent short treatise on fiefs
and homage – a Tractatus super feudis et homagiis. In 1906, Jean Acher
was misled by the unknown compiler of this only witness and edited this
Tractatus as a self-standing work. Acher had noticed some issues con-
cerning the reliability of this compiler, but he did not realise the extent of
his manipulations on the texts contained in the code. Several tracts are
misattributed, and nearly all contain deceptive interpolations.57 Blanot’s
text, in particular, though rightly attributed to the Burgundian author,
was not only misleadingly reported as a self-standing tract, with no
connection to the broader treatise De actionibus of which it was an
extract; it was also interpolated with several additions and citations from
the Libri feudorum that were in fact not present in the original text of
Blanot’s De actionibus.58 Therefore, the reliance of Blanot on the Libri is
much less significant than historians have thought in the past. This is
very important, since the treatise De actionibus was most likely written in
Italy in the mid-thirteenth century, i.e. when the Bolognese scholars were
well acquainted with the Libri and the glossae apparatus was near com-
pletion, if not already completed. Notwithstanding this, Blanot developed
his arguments on feudal homage – i.e. homage which entails the grant of
55 Acher, ‘Notes’, 161–4; J. Richard, ‘Les exemples bourguignons dans le traité des hommage
et des fiefs de Jean de Blanot’, Mémoires de la Société pour l’Histoire du Droit et des
Institutions des anciens pays bourguignons, comtois et romands, 18 (1956), 107–12.
56 Richard, ‘Les exemples’; remarks shared by Giordanengo, ‘Jean Blanc’, 76 n. 29; Reynolds,
Fiefs and Vassals, 281–3.
57 Acher, ‘Notes’. See some remarks and bibliography in A. Stella, ‘The Summa Feudorum
of MS Parma 1227: A Work by Iacobus Aurelianus?’, Reti Medievali Rivista, 20(2) (2019),
271–327, at 273–5.
58 There is no critical edition of De actionibus. I have derived these conclusions from E.
Conte, Servi medievali. Dinamiche del diritto comune (Rome, 1996), 230–4, and from two
manuscripts: Sion, Archives et Bibliothèque Cantonales (ABC), S. 102; Paris, Bibliothèque
Nationale de France, Lat. 4106.
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a fief (homagium ratione feudi) – without considering the scholarly
interpretations of the book that were available at the time.
The insertions by our unknown interpolator correspond mostly with
arguments that Blanot built considering the customs held ‘in some
places’ (‘in aliquibus locis’), ‘parts’ (partes), ‘regions’ (regiones) or even
the entirety of France (‘per vulgare Francie’). This positioning suggests
that our unknown interpolator was interested in highlighting the diver-
gences between the local customs of France and the Libri. The contrast
between the two, however, was implicitly subsumed in nearly all of
Blanot’s treatment of homage and fiefs. This contrast emerges very
clearly in the argument concerning the heritability of the feudal bond,
in which Blanot asked whether succession into fiefs was like other kinds
of succession. His answer was negative, because neither women nor
monks nor the maimed could succeed into fiefs, and this was ‘according
to the custom approved by Lord Frederick I, as it is contained in the
constitution concerning the usages of fiefs’ – this is as far as Blanot went
in mentioning the Libri, without citing any specific chapter of the book.59
However, he went on to say that in some regions the custom was (‘in
aliquibus locis est consuetudo’) that women, agnates, cognates, and even
non-relatives may succeed in the absence of closer relatives.60 In another
passage, he questioned the principle of egalitarian inheritance in fiefs that
underpinned most of the Libri, this time not even mentioning the book,
by expounding a ‘statement of custom’ (‘declaratio consuetudinis’):
in many places, it is observed by custom that if someone is my man and
holds all his property in fief from me, his firstborn takes an oath of fidelity
to me and is bound to serve me against my enemies, for . . . it is rightful to
choose one [heir], and custom chooses the firstborn . . . The same way
custom burdens the firstborn on the one hand, so on the other one it
benefits him because his younger brothers are bound to do homage and
take an oath of fidelity to him . . . and this is the custom in the regions
beyond the Alps.61
Custom – and in no way the Libri – governs succession in fiefs. The
authority of local custom was then restated in the description of the
59 Sion, ABC, 102, fo. 20rb: ‘non, quia nec mulier, nec monachus, nec mancus succedit in
feudum, secundum consuetudinem approbatam per dominum Fredericum seniorem, ut
in const(itutione) de usibus feudorum continetur.’ The unknown interpolator at this
point cites eight chapters of the Libri: LF 1.8.2, 1.4, 2.11, 2.17, 2.50, 2.21, 2.26.6, 2.30.
60 Sion, ABC, 102, fo. 20rb.
61 Acher, ‘Notes’, 156–7.
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nature of the feudal contract. The point of departure was the acknow-
ledgement that if not even death could free a man from the obligations of
homage – since his heirs would inherit them – the waiver of the fief
would in no way suffice to exempt the vassal from such obligations.
Blanot first discarded the opinion held by ‘some people’ (‘ut voluerunt
quidam dicere’) according to which the feudal contract was ‘innominate’,
i.e. a contract which does not conform to a standard set by law and which
parties create ad hoc based on specific needs. More specifically, Blanot
challenged the idea that the feudal contract was of the kind ‘do ut facias’,
a service contract by which someone gives something in exchange for a
performance. He found a more fitting analogy with other ‘nominate’
contracts founded in Roman law, such as emphyteusis, according to
which withdrawal was not allowed after the closing (D. 12.4.16,
C. 4.10.5, C. 4.66.1) – a good analogy with the impossibility of a vassal
withdrawing from feudal obligations. However, since the feudal contract
did not rest on written law, Blanot went on to suggest that even though it
was derived from custom (‘inductus de consuetudine’), it was nonetheless
‘nominate’: it conformed to a standard. This standard was provided by
the binding force of custom, which, as Blanot asserted throughout the
tract, was an unwritten tradition substantially diverging from the content
of the Libri.62
The Feudal Contract and Customary Law according to Aurelianus
The notions on which Blanot rested his arguments on custom are
strikingly similar to the ones utilised by another French lawyer active
in the mid-thirteenth century: Iacobus de Aurelianis, or Aurelianus
(Jacques d’Orleans). He was the author of some glossae and additiones
to the Libri feudorum and possibly the compiler of an alternative version
of the Libri, known as the Liber domini Iacobi de Aurelianis. In a recent
essay, I suggested that Aurelianus was the author of the mysterious
Summa feudorum transmitted by MS Parma 1227, the authorship of
which has been the object of several speculations.63 This Summa is an
unfinished work, the definitive version of which is unfortunately lost.
62 Ibid., 149 and 171. On later interpretations of this definition, see A. Massironi,
Nell’officina dell’interprete. La qualificazione del contratto nel diritto comune (secoli
XIV–XVI) (Milan, 2012), 312 n. 44.
63 Stella, ‘The Summa Feudorum’, 272–85, with an updated edition of the Summa at
287–327.
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Like Blanc’s Epitome, it is a commentary upon the Libri feudorum,
written in the wake of the Italian tradition. While it has been seen as a
practice-oriented treatise, there is scarcely a mention of specific cases and
usages.64 Nonetheless, even if Aurelianus moved more comfortably than
Blanot within the maze of Canon law sources and his pattern of
reasoning denoted much stronger influences of the liberal arts, this
Summa presents several points of convergence with the work of the
Burgundian lawyer.
In particular, the two authors seem to share the same ideas about
primogeniture and the nature of the feudal contract.65 Concerning the
former, we have seen that in his ‘statement of custom’ Blanot suggested
that the consuetudo of the regions beyond the Alps (‘partes ultramonta-
nas’) was to choose the firstborn (‘consuetudo eligit primogenitum’).
Aurelianus suggested that by the custom of ‘our regions’ (‘in partibus
nostris’), the lord chooses the firstborn urged by the necessity of custom
(‘dominus primogenitum eligit necessitate consuetudinis suadente’).66
The idea is the same and is expounded through a strikingly similar
vocabulary. What is more, precisely like Blanot, Aurelianus thought of
the feudal contract as a nominate contract founded in custom (‘contrac-
tus nominatus consuetudine inventus’). In his Summa, however, the
argument is much more sophisticated than in Blanot’s tract. Aurelianus
developed it very carefully, weighing all the elements, in a skilful appli-
cation of logic to legal reasoning.67 He first reported two different
opinions: some authors say that the feudal contract is a service contract
(‘do ut facias’) which is ‘innominate’ and thus with no foundation in Civil
law; some others, including Roffredus, hold that it is a donatio sub modo,
a donation given on determined conditions, hence a nominate contract,
the substance and form of which was provided by Roman law. From the
synthesis of these two elements, Aurelianus suggests the emergence of a
third one:
64 E. Cortese, ‘Scienza di giudici, scienza di professori tra XII e XIII secolo’, in E. Cortese,
Scritti, ed. I. Birocchi, 2 vols. (Spoleto, 1999), vol. I, 93–148, at 143–4.
65 It seems possible that Aurelianus knew Blanot’s work – one might even wonder if he
attended Blanot’s lectures in Bologna. The attendance of French students at Blanot’s
Bolognese lectures would explain Blanot’s choice to clarify legal arguments in light of
customs and examples from Burgundy and France. One of the main problems, nonethe-
less, is that Aurelianus was keen on mentioning very explicitly the authors on whom he
relied, but he did not cite Blanot at all.
66 Stella, ‘The Summa Feudorum’, 290, at lines 107–13.
67 Ibid., 297–8, at lines 375–424.
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I say that it is a contract in itself which has something of the aforemen-
tioned service contract and something of the donatio sub modo. Hence a
tertium quid is obtained which possesses its own nature, conception, and
definition . . . I say that if we consider its form, this is a nominate contract
founded in custom, but if we consider its matter, it took its origin from
the ius gentium (see the argument as in D. 43.26.1 and 43.26.14).68
Resorting to the notions of matter and form (materia and forma), he
asserts that the substantial existence of the feudal contract could derive
its form only from customary law. He cites the Libri feudorum (LF 2.32),
where it is said that the ‘solemnity of custom’, i.e. right customary
procedure, is needed to consider a feudal grant to be valid. On this
specific point, Aurelianus did not use the book to provide a statement
of custom but as a source to prove the vital function of custom in shaping
the feudal contract. This is even clearer from the following step of the
argument, in which Aurelianus compared this contract with verbal
agreements, such as stipulatio and acceptilatio, and with serfdom. By
their substance, they all originally belonged to the ius gentium, i.e. the
composite body of unwritten laws and principles which, according to
Roman law, were innate and common to all peoples (D. 1.1.1.5, 1.1.5).
These analogies led the argument to its finale: since ‘the form gives
existence to the substance’ (‘forma dat esse rei’), a maxim possibly
borrowed from Peter of Spain’s treatise on logic, Aurelianus concluded
‘daringly that it must be held that the feudal contract is a nominate
contract founded in custom, for it takes its existence (esse suum) from
custom’.69 The bottom line is that the verbal agreements between lords
and vassals would be no ‘contract’ were it not for the crystallisation
granted by custom. Interestingly, the Libri entered this argument as an
authoritative source to prove that certain formalised practices and rituals
were needed for the feudal contract to subsist. However, the ius con-
suetudinarium that provided these agreements with a nomen was not the
text of the Libri feudorum, which, as the author admitted, ‘is most
disorganised and averts me, and perhaps many others, from the way of
truth’.70 The form, and hence the existence of the feudal contract, could
only be provided by unwritten custom.
68 Ibid., 298, at lines 398–401.
69 Petrus Hispanus, Summule logicales, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Leiden, 1972), 68; Stella, ‘The
Summa Feudorum’, 299, at lines 420–424.
70 Stella, ‘The Summa Feudorum’, 278.
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Feudal Law and the Making of the ius commune
This initial contribution to the study of the geographical dimensions of
feudal law, its interrelations with local custom and its long-standing yet
unsettled dialectics with the Libri feudorum has been suggestive from
several points of view. In the first place, the three examples we have
observed attest to very different approaches to the relationship between
custom and the Libri. Blanc and Aurelianus took it as a reference book
but did not share the same view on its nature and function. Blanc seems
to have pursued a project of expansion of the boundaries set by the Libri,
accepting both its normative potential and its authority as a source for
legal arguments. Aurelianus, on his part, did not spare criticism of the
Libri, but he nonetheless decided to dedicate a treatise to it. Although he
did not question its utility as a text to drive doctrinal debate on fiefs, he
shared Blanot’s mistrusting attitude towards its normative value and its
applicability to non-Italian contexts. Coming to Blanot, further analysis
is needed to clarify his actual reliance on the Libri. Nonetheless, he
certainly believed that the book was not an appropriate tool for describ-
ing homage and the feudal bond to a Burgundian or French audience.
This sentiment, we know, was shared by generations of later French
scholars, even those who cited and commented upon the Libri. The roots
of the sixteenth-century debate on the authority and normativity of the
book in the French contexts thus originated at the very first encounter of
French scholars with it.
In the second place, the reliance of the norms regulating fiefs and
homage on local usages compelled lawyers to take a clear stance on the
matter of custom. The survival of unwritten legal traditions and the fact
that ‘learned’ lawyers were ready to receive them and combine them within
more or less structured theories of ‘authority’ and ‘normativity’ would
suggest some continuity, if not circularity, between the two spheres of
social practice and legal doctrine. Such circularity narrows significantly the
alleged gap dividing ‘warm natural custom’ from ‘cold artificial law’, a gap
that, as we have seen, underpins several historical paradigms of legal and
institutional change in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Western Europe. In
particular, this circularity questions the very idea that ‘learned law’ should
be seen just as a product of the professionalisation, or bureaucratisation, of
the legal profession, and casts doubts on the foundations on which models
of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century ‘transition’ rely.
Ultimately, by pointing at the geographical dimensions of these doc-
trinal debates and their relationship with local and unwritten customs,
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our examples provide a vantage point to observe some underestimated
processes at work in the making of the ius commune. Legal historians
have often tended to stress uniformity and unity in explaining its emer-
gence.71 Feudal law and its absorption within the system of the ius
commune offer a slightly different perspective, telling us a story in which
local legal traditions not only survived but remained a constitutive
element of the Western European experiences of law.
71 Bellomo, The Common Legal Past; P. Grossi, A History of European Law (Chichester,
2010), 24–38.
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